ABSTRACT. This paper discusses the conditions for generalizing the analysis in Weitzman (1974) 
I. INTRODUCTION
Fisheries economists usually recommend the use of a system of individual transferable quotas (ITQs) or taxes as the regulatory instruments that secure economic efficiency, (see Clark 1985) . With regard to ITQs, compliance is often mentioned as a problem that prevents a first-best optimum from being reached (see Copes 1986 ), while taxes have been criticized for posing excessive information requirements, (see Amason 1990) .
The equivalence of transferable permits or quotas and taxes in terms of economic efficiency under full information has been shown repeatedly in the pollution control literature (see, e.g., Baumol and Oates 1988) as well as in the fisheries economic literature (see, e.g., Moloney and Pearse 1979) . Furthermore, within the pollution control literature, there are many analyses of the choice between price and quantity regulation under imperfect information. The classic article within this area is Weitzman (1974) , where it is shown that, within this particular setting, the choice between price and quantity regulation depends on the sign of the sum of the slopes of the marginal benefit and marginal If the marginal benefit function is fiat and the marginal cost function is steep, price regulation is preferred over quantity regulation, while quantity regulation is preferred over price regulation if the marginal benefit function is steep and the marginal cost function is fiat.
Even though it is well documented in the pollution control literature that the equivalence between price and quantity regulation does not hold in the presence of imperfect information, it is often not well understood in the literature of fisheries management. This can be illustrated by quoting Clark (1985) , "The relationship between taxes and quota market prices might be clarified in the stochastic setting by modeling the quota market, but we shall not pursue the study here (see Weitzman 1974) ." Weitzman (2002) studies imperfect information about the stock-recruitment relation and shows that taxes are preferred over ITQs in this case. With a tax it is possible to let a desired quantity of recruiters escape, while there is no guarantee of this with quantity regulation. Weitzman (2002) calls imperfect information about the stock-recruitment relation "ecological uncertainty". He also defines economic uncertainty as uncertainty about the profit function and writes, "Pure economic uncertainty is a typical 'price-vsquantity type ' mixed situation." This implies that the slope of the marginal cost and marginal benefit function are important for the choice between price and quantity regulation. Others that have worked with the choice between price and quantity regulation under uncertainty include Anderson (1986) and Androkovich and Stollery (1991) . However, their approaches differ from the approach taken in this paper (the Weitzman approach), with respect to the timing of decisions taken by the fishermen. In the Weitzman approach, decisions are taken ex post (after the realization of a random variable), while decisions are taken ex ante (before the realization of a random variable) in Anderson (1986) and Androkovich and Stollery (1991) . Furthermore, these authors assume a very simple, linear growth function. Even with this growth function the solution becomes very complicated. The purpose of this paper is to analyze conditions for generalizing the results in Weitzman (1974) on economic uncertainty to fisheries economics.' In other words, we examine whether tbe statements by Weitzman (2002) and Clark (1985) quoted above, are correct. In order to discuss tbis issue, it is useful to give a brief introduction to tbe pollution control literature.
It turns out tbat an important determinant of conditions for generalizing tbe Weitzman result is tbe cost function. Assume tbat q is tbe catcb, x is the stock and 9 is a random variable. A cost function is directly additive separable in catcbes and stock size if the marginal cost of catches does not depend on stock size. Therefore, directly additive separability can be expressed as Ciq, x, 9) = dq, 9) + dxy Tbe discussion of direct additive separability can be related to tbe discussion of scbooling and searcb fisberies. Neber (1990) defines a schooling fishery as a fishery for wbich tbe fisb stock size does not infiuence tbe cost of fisbing iCiq)). Tbe berring fishery is an example of sucb a fisbery, and berring is typically found in shoals. A search fishery is defined as a fisbery wbere tbe fish stock influences the cost of fishing. Cod is an example of sucb a fish stock, and cod is typically spread over a fishery area iCiq, x)). Clark (1985) defines a scbooling fisbery witb searcb costs and specifies Ciq) = c^q -f Cj, where c, is tbe marginal catcb costs and c, is tbe searcb costs. An alternative formulation of tbe scbooling fisbery witb searcb costs will be Ciq, x) = c^q -\-c,,x, which could capture tbat stock size influences tbe costs incurred to identify sboals. This could be tbe case for berring. Based on Neber (1990) and Clark (1985) tbree different kinds of fisberies can, tberefore, be identified:
• A scbooling fisbery without searcb costs iCiq, 9)). In this case costs are independent of stock size.
• A scbooling fishery with searcb costs iCiq, X, 9) = Ciq, 9) + C(jc)). Now costs are directly additive separable in catcbes and stock size.
• A searcb fisbery iCiq, x, 9) witb Q, 0 ). Tbere is interaction in tbe cost function between stock size and catches.
Tbe two schooling cases do not rule out density or age as important determinants for landings. However, an adequate cbaracterization of stock cbaracteristics cannot be given and tberefore fisberies economics usually relies on resource levels, Anotber aspect tbat requires attention is the issue of variable versus fixed costs. Under a search fishery, tbe stock size is treated as a variable production factor, wbile searcb costs are treated as a fixed cost in a scbooling fisbery without searcb costs. This case may be tbougbt of as unrealistically. As tbe stock size becomes larger, the schools become denser, or more scbools are formed. In tbis case, searcb costs become an inverse function of stock size. However, typically there is a range of stocks for wbicb landings do not cbange. Then, tbe stocks drop so low that landings and costs do cbange. In otber words, a shifting factor is created in the cost specification and this may justify wby Ciq, 9).
In this paper it is sbown tbat tbe results in Weitzman (1974) bold for fisheries in tbe ' Note that in the discussion of conditions for generalizing the result in Weitzman (1974) , ecological uncertainty is assumed away, As pointed out by one of the referees, Theil (1977) classify the technology as being independent if the cost function can be decomposed into separate components. With the cost function in this paper, the technology is independent if C{q, x, 9) = C{q, 6) -H C{x). 417 two schooling fisheries but not for a search fishery. Therefore, the statements by Weitzman (2002) and Clark (1985) are imprecise, because Weitzman's results only hold for schooling fisheries, with and without search costs.
For a schooling fishery, where the marginal cost function is steeper than the marginal benefit function, taxes are preferred over ITQs in terms of economic efficiency if the regulatory authority (society) is unsure about marginal costs. However, Wilen (2000) mentions that individual quotas regulate about 55 fisheries, while taxes regulate none. Among schooling fisheries the herring fishery in Iceland is managed by ITQs, see Amason (1993) . These facts are, as argued in Section 4, surprising, in light of the analysis in this paper.
The paper is organized as follows. The pollution control literature on the choice between price and quantity regulation is further discussed in Section 2. In Section 3, the model from Weitzman (1974) is developed for fisheries, while Section 4 analyses conditions required for the result from Weitzman (1974) to hold for fisheries. Section 5 concludes the paper.
II. THE POLLUTION CONTROL LITERATURE
Let us start by sketching the results in Weitzman (1974) for pollution. Weitzman reaches four main conclusions. First, under full information it does not matter whether taxes or individual permits are used. Both instruments secure a first-best optimum. The use of the word first-best optimum may be questioned.^ In a general model, the first-best optimum requires that all sectors in the economy are maximizing net benefits to society. Moreover, Layard and Walters (1978) illustrate that the first-best solution requires that there are no substitutes or complements in consumption, production of goods or factors of production. However, as used in this paper, the term first-best optimum is consistent with a partial model. In other words, it is assumed that the rest of the economy is in equilibrium in this paper. Second, an error in estimating the benefit function has adverse effects on welfare, but the welfare loss does not differ between price and quantity regulation. In other words, it does not matter for the choice between taxes and transferable permits if there is imperfect information about benefits. Third, if there is uncertainty about costs, price regulation is preferred over quantity regulation if the marginal costs are steeper than the marginal benefit function. Fourth, transferable permits are preferred over taxes in the case of imperfect information about costs if the marginal benefit function is steeper than the marginal cost function.
Indeed, Weitzman (1974) arrives at the following formula for the choice between price and quantity regulation:
V is the relative advantage of price over quantity regulation measured in terms of welfare. If V > 0, price regulation is preferred over quantity regulation, while V < 0 implies that quantity regulation is preferred over price regulation; a^ is the variance of the error in marginal costs;
C" is the slope of a linear marginal cost function. It is assumed that C" > 0;
B" is the slope of a linear marginal benefit function. It is assumed that B" < 0.
An interpretation of [1] is given in Section 4
where conditions for generalizing the Weitzman results for fisheries are discussed. Hoel and Karp (2001) consider the case where environmental damage depends on the stock of pollution. As in Weitzman (1974) , the curvature of cost and benefit functions is important. However, now the discount rate, the stock's decay rate, and society's ability to make adjustments will also influence the choice between price and quantity regulation under imperfect information.
Even though the model structure of the fisheries problem is the same, costs are re-lated to both the stock and flow variables for a search fishery iC{q, x}), while benefits are related to the flow variable.
III. A WEITZMAN MODEL FOR FISHERIES
The basic welfare economics problem that arises under open access is that each individual fisherman disregards the effect that catches have on the stock size (the resource restriction is excluded from the maximization problem). In order to correct this market failure, society faces two choices if a firstbest solution is to be obtained under full information. First, it can set a total quota and allocate the quota to the fishermen by means of a system of ITQs. Second, it can tax catches. The notion of a first-best solution may also be questioned here. Scott (1993) discusses how ITQs (or output taxes) on the resource flow rather than the resource stock are not a complete first-best solution. Some technological stock externality remains. An alternative could be to use transferable effort rights or effort taxes. Danielson (2002) studies the choice between effort quotas and catch quotas under uncertainty about the stock relation and catch per unit of effort (CPUE). It is shown that if the uncertainty in the stock relation is large, effort management is preferred, while catch quotas are preferred if the uncertainty in CPUE is large. However, the approach taken in this paper differs from the approach in Danielson (2()02) because the choice between price and quantity regulation is analyzed under economic uncertainty and in this case a first-best solution is not arrived at with effort regulation because the effort is a multi-dimensional variable that cannot be measured with accuracy (Dupont 1991) .'' Let C{q, x) be the cost function ' and B(q) be the benefit of catches.* B(q) -C{q, x) is the economic yield and this economic yield is maximized.' By maximizing economic yield, discounting is disregarded. Even though it is customary to include discounting in studies of fisheries (see, e.g., Conrad and Clark 1991) , it is excluded in this paper because the purpose of this paper is to analyze conditions for generalizing the analysis in Weitzman (1974) . Therefore, the simplest possible model is selected. Nonetheless, including discounting does not change the fundamental results. Another critique that can be raised of the chosen welfare measure is that fisheries involve multiple markets. The fishing industry is composed of dockside sales, processing, retail and final consumption. When the issue of price versus quantity regulation shall be clarified, the ef'fects on the whole industry must be considered. However, this critique is not necessary correct. Just and Hueth (1979) shows that the area behind a supply curve in an intermediate market not only measures the rents in that market but also rents for all producers selling in more basic markets plus initial producers surplus. Thus, by defining welfare as longrun economic yield, the rents of, for example, the processing industry is also captured.
The following assumptions are made with regard to the cost and benefit functions:
• Marginal benefits are non-increasing.
(Bqqig) ^ 0, where the subscript denotes partial derivatives).
•
• Note also that ad valorum and lump sum taxes are not used. Grafton (1994) combines ITQs and various tax systems under price uncertainty and shows that, for example, ad valorum taxes can be used for rent capturing. However, the approach taken in this paper is different because the single choice between price and quantity regulation is studied. In this case, it is well ktiown within welfare economics that ad valorum taxes and lump sum taxes will not secure a first-best optimum (Boadway and Wildasin 1984) .
' The cost function is defined in terms of opportunity costs. However, the rest of the economy is in equilibrium so the schooling and search specifications from the introduction hold when costs are defined as opportunity costs.
' Benefits are defined as the sum of producers and consumers surplus; see Boadway and Wildasin (1984) .
' By defining the welfare function in this way it is implicitly assumed that the regulatory costs are zero or the same for price and quantity regulation. In theory, the regulatory costs of the two regulatory instruments must be included if a selection between price and quantity regulation is to be made. However, the assumption about identical regulatory costs is useful, because it keeps the analysis focused.
' In order to keep the analysis as general as possible, it is useful to change notation and let subscripts denote partial derivatives. The reason for this is that the general model allows for non-linear marginal costs and benefits, while the derivation of V in Section 4 approximates the marginal costs and benefits functions with linear curves.
• For any stock size, marginal costs are increasing in catches (C^giq, x) > 0). • The costs of catches do not rise with stock size. In other words, as the stock goes up, the costs go down (C^(^, x) <0).
• It is always profitable to catch some of the stock (B,(0) > C,(0, x)).
• Above some catch level, the marginal benefits are lower than the marginal costs (B^iq) < C^(q, x) for q > q*).
These assumptions ensure that an optimum is reached. Under full information, the maximization problem for society is to find q* and x* such that:
where F(x) is the natural growth. An implication of [3] is that a steady-state equilibrium is analyzed. With the assumed non-linearity of the objective function, a gradual adjustment toward the steady-state is optimal and a feed-back rule can be used. In this paper, the focus is on steady-state equilibrium since this is the simplest possible assumption. However, studies of choices between regulatory instruments under gradual adjustment toward equilibrium are a promising future research area, but the fundamental results in this paper are not changed by analyzing adjustments toward equilibrium.'
On the basis of [2] and [3], a Lagrange function can be set up. Denote the optimal solutions q*, x* and X*, where A, > 0 is a Lagrange multiplier and a measure of the marginal user costs of the fisheries stock. The first-order condition for catches satisfies:
[4]
Equation [4] states that society selects catches where marginal benefits, {B^{q*)), equal marginal social costs, {CAq*, x*) + X*), Now something can be said about the choice between price and quantity regulation. Call the optimal price of catches p* and set this price such that: p* = B,{q*) = C,{q*, X*) + X*).
[5]
Equation [5] says that society selects the optimal price such that it equals the marginal social cost and it makes no difference whether society announces the optimal size of catches or the price. With perfect information both price and quantity regulation secures a first-best optimum. This result is also shown in, for example, Moloney and Pearse (1979) .
One reason for the break down of the equivalence between price and quantity regulation can be asymmetric information between society and the fishermen, see Hoel and Karp (2001) . Assume, therefore, that society has imperfect information about costs. Formally, this may be written as C{q, x 9), where 0 is a random variable which measures the information gap. In other words, 9 captures that society is not as well informed about the fishermen's costs as the fishermen themselves. An example of 9 could be imperfect information about an exogenous cost parameter. Assume also that a random variable, \i., governs the benefit function such that B{q, \i). Again |j, measures an information gap and, as above, | X captures that society is not as well informed about the benefit of the fishery as the fishermen. An example of |J, could be imperfect information about prices.'" When selecting the optimal quantity or price, society maximizes expected social welfare. It is necessary to choose prices and catches before the values of |j, and 9 is known. The actual welfare loss is determined after the values of 9 and \x. is known. Now the imperfect information model is analyzed for quantity regulation and price regulation. ' Assume that discounting and adjustments toward equilibrium are allowed. Now a present value Hamiltonian can be set up. However, the first order condition with respect to catches remains the same and therefore, the expression for V is unchanged in steady-state.
'" For the purpose of this section, it is not necessary to describe the properties of 9 and |x. August 2003
Quantity Regulation
The optimal quantity instrument under imperfect information about costs and benefits is the quantity that maximizes:
where E is an expectation operator. Again, a Lagrange function can be set up. Call tjie optimal solutions to the model q, x, and X. The first-order condition for catches satisfies:
EiB,(q, n)) = EiCJq, X, 6)) + X. [8] In analogy with full information, expected marginal benefits equal expected marginal social costs for q. Note that [8] corresponds to an ex ante selection of both a quantity and a stock size with the first-order condition for stock and the restriction.
Price Regulation
Now consider price regulation. The supply response function, q = h(p, 9, x), expresses how the fishermen respond to price changes, and can be found from the fishermen's maximization problems. 9 is included in hip, 9, x) because it is the supply response function as perceived by society that is of interest. As previously mentioned, the externality problem is that the fishermen disregard the effects that catches have on stock size, so the fisherman's maximization problem may be written as:
Max phip, e, x) -Cih{p, 9, x), x, 9).
Equation [9] corresponds to letting one fisherman select aggregated catches.
The first-order condition for hip, 9, x) is: P = , 9, X), X, 9).
[10]
The interpretation of [10] is that the marginal benefit, ip), equals marginal private costs, , 9, X), X, 9)). Now the interest is in finding the optimal ex-ante solution for price regulation given the fishermen's response function, (/i(p, 9, x) ). Call these p, X and x. Society will choose the variables according to the following maximization problem:
Max EiBihip, 9, x), \i)
, e, X), X, Q)), [11] [12]
The first-order condition with respect to the price satisfies:
h,ip,e,x)) + XEih,,ip, e, x)) [13] where hpip, 9, x) is the response of catches to a marginal change in prices, and [13] expresses that the expected benefit from a marginal change in price, (£'(fi/,(/z(p, 9, x) , [i)hpip, 9, x))), must be equal to the expected social cost of a marginal price change Eidhip, 9, X), X, mpip, e, X)) = XEihpip, 9, x))). From [10] , the fisherman's selection of price may be expressed as p = Ch{h{p, 9, x), X, 9). By inserting this into [13] , and rearranging, it is obtained that:
The optimal ex ante price is, therefore, the expected marginal benefit minus the user costs of a marginal price change, divided by the expected response of catches to a marginal price change. Corresponding to an ex ante optimal price is an ex post catch level, which may be expressed as qiQ) = hip, 9, x).
Even though both of the quantity and price regulations analyzed above yield an optimum ex ante, it is unlikely that any of the instruments will yield an optimum ex post, since, in all likelihood, it will^be the case that B^iq, ) ^ C,iq, X, QI+ X and B,(<7(9), |.l) ) , X, 0) + X. The relevant question is.
therefore, which regulatory instrument secures the highest welfare ex post. This is the question to which attention is now turned.
IV. PRICES VERSUS QUANTITIES FOR FISHERIES
In this section, the issue of prices versus quantities for fisheries is discussed. The comparative advantage of prices over quantities can be defined as the total net benefit under price regulation minus the total net benefit under quantity regulation:
If V > 0, price regulation is preferred over quantity regulation, because the net benefits associated with quantity regulation are smaller than those of price regulation. V < 0 implies that quantity regulation is preferred over price regulation. The choice between price and quantity regulation for a schooling fishery without search costs, a schooling fishery with search costs, and a search fishery are now examined.
A Schooling Fishery without Search Costs
Assume first that the fishery is a schooling fishery without search costs. In this case, stock effects do not matter on the cost side, so the cost function may be written as Ciq, 6), In order to ease the interpretation of [15] , it needs to be simplified. Therefore, a second-order Taylor approximation of costs and benefits is used; see Weitzman (1974) . In this formulation, cost and benefits vary within the range ofthe optimal catch under price regulation around the optimal catch under quantity control. In other words, the costs and benefits under price regulation are measured in relation to the costs and benefits under quantity regulation. Let ~ denote a local approximation. Then:
Five assumptions and observations are worth mentioning with respect to cost and benefit functions. First, c( (9) and bi[i.) translate different values of \\. and 9 into pure vertical shifts of the cost and benefit functions. Furthermore, a(9) = dq, 9) and bi\i) = Biq, |i,). In other words, a(9) corresponds to the total cost of catches under quantity control and bi\)i) is the total benefit under quantity control. From this fact it follows that it is enough to concentrate on finding the optimal catches under price regulation. Second, it is assumed that a(9) and P(|^j are independently distributed. This implies that £'(a(9)) = £(|3(|^)) = 0 and £(a(9)P(n)) = 0. Third, the marginal costs and marginal benefits can be identified. Differentiating [16] and [17] yields:
, 9) -C + a(9) and == fi' -H
B"iq -q)
[18]
[19]
Fourth, the fixed coefficients in [16] and [17] can be analyzed. Since Eiq) = q and £(a(9)) = £(p(9)) = 0, C -EiC.iq, 9)) and S' =-EiB^iq, \i)). Therefore, C is the expected marginal cost of catches and B' is the expected marginal benefit. Furthermore, C" = C,,iq, 9) and B" = B^^iq, ]x) (C" is the curvature of the cost function, and B" is the curvature ofthe benefit function). From the assumptions in Section 3, it follows that B" <0< C". Finally, the implication ofthe assumed cost and benefit functions are that a(9) and |3(p,) represent pure unbiased shifts in the marginal cost and benefit functions.
The variances of marginal costs and benefits are, by definition, the mean square of errors in marginal costs and benefits: o^ = EiC.iq, 9) -FiC.iq, 9))« £(a(9)^), [20] [16]
[21 ]
Now V can be calculated. In the Appendix it is shown that:
Note that [22] is exactly the same formula as expressed in [1] . Thus, for a schooling fishery without search costs there is nothing wrong with quoting Weitzman's analysis. Five conclusions may be drawn. First, imperfect information about benefits does not enter in [22] , The reason is that with a second order approximation price and quantity regulation are affected equally." Second,V depends linearly on al As a^ ->0 the perfect information case is arrived at, while increasing 0m agnifies the expected loss of employing a regulatory instrument. Third, V depends critically on the curvature of the cost and benefit functions. The sign of V is simply the sign of C" + B". Fourth, quantity regulation is preferred if the benefit function is sharply curved and the cost function is close to linear. In these cases the coefficient of V is negative. Fifth, when the benefit function is close to linear, price regulation is preferred. In this case V is large and positive. For fisheries without stock effects on the cost side where marginal costs are steeper than marginal benefits, price regulation is preferred over quantity regulation if society is unsure about marginal costs. As mentioned in the Introduction, over 55 fisheries are managed with individual quotas while none are managed with taxes. This fact is surprising in light of the analysis in this paper because is seems likely that for some schooling fisheries without search costs, marginal costs are steeper than marginal benefits.
A Schooling Fishery with Search Costs
Assume instead that the fishery is a schooling fishery with search costs. Now dq, X, 9) = Ciq, 9) + Cix) and assume that Cxx = 0.'^ A second-order approximation around q and x yields: dq, X, 9) = a(9) + (C
where r\ is the marginal cost reduction associated with derivations of tock size under price regulation from stock size under quantity regulation. Retaining all the assumptions and notation from above it is shown in appendix that:
[24]
The only difference between this formula and [1] is that the difference in cost reductions due to increased stock sizes, between quantity and price regulation is reflected in the formula. If the stock size under price regulation is larger than the stock size under quantity regulation, there will be a tendency to favor price over quantity regulation. However, [24] shows that if the cost function is direct additively separable in stock size and catches, there is nothing wrong with quoting the analysis by Weitzman (1974) , and a directly additive separable cost function is a sufficient condition for generalizing the Weitzman result for fisheries.
Search Fishery
For a search fishery, the cost function is not directly additive separable in stock size " A similar conclusion is mentioned in Andersen (1982) , who analyses price uncertainty and shows that a tax on catches and ITQs yields the same results, ' The assumption that C« = 0 is by no means critical. Assume instead that C« > 0, In this case a second order approximation around q and x gives the result that:
Ciq, X, 9) » a(e) + (C + a(e))(9 -q)
where r|' is the marginal cost reduction associated with an increased stock size and r\" is the curvature of the stock cost function. Now: V =
2C"
YiX -X) + Y^ -xf. and catches and the second-order approximation around andof the cost function becomes complex, because cross partial derivatives (Cj,^{q, X, 9)) and interactive terms ({x -x) {q -q)) (are included.'^ In order to say something more about this case, assume that F(x) is given by a second-order approximation around i.'"* Now the optimal quantity and stock size under price regulation may be found by solving four equations in four unknowns,'^ and the expression for V becomes so complex that it is impossible to say anything about the choice between price and quantity regulation under imperfect information.'* Indeed, multiplicative terms between tbe slope of the marginal cost function and tbe parameters in the natural growth are included in V, and tbere migbt not be an easy way to extend Weitzman's analysis to a searcb fisbery.
Tbis conclusion can be related to tbe models in Hoel and Karp (2001) . As mentioned in tbe introduction, these authors describe tbe case where tbe benefit of pollution depends on tbe stock of pollution. However, tbe costs only depend on tbe flow of pollution. In sucb a model it is possible to generalize tbe Weitzman analysis.
V. CONCLUSION
In tbis paper tbe use of prices versus quantities for regulating fisheries bave been analyzed. Tbe analysis sbows tbat a sufficient condition for generalizing Weitzman's analysis for fisheries is tbat tbe cost function is directly additive separable in stock size and catches. For tbis reason, it migbt not be correct to quote Weitzman's analysis in connection witb analysis of fisberies management for a searcb fishery. A further result is related to schooling fisberies witbout searcb costs. Here it is sbown tbat taxes are preferred over ITQs if tbe marginal cost function is steeper tban tbe marginal benefit function.
Tbese conclusions are sbown witb two simplifying assumptions. First, a steady-state equilibrium model is developed. Second, long-run economic yield is maximized. Promising areas for future researcb is to study tbe cboice between price and quantity regulation witb tbe inclusion of a discount rate and an adjustment process toward equilibrium. However, tbe fundamental results in tbis paper do not cbange if adjustment toward equilibrium and discounting are included.
Anotber simplifying assumption is tbe single species assumption. Under a single species assumption it is sbown tbat tbere are difficulties in generalizing tbe Weitzman results for a searcb fisbery. Assume tbat tbe cost function must capture economic interaction between two stocks. In tbis case, tbe expression for V becomes more complex so it is even more difficult to generalize tbe Weitzman results to a multi-species setting. Anotber question tbat arises is wbetber all possible cost functions bave been examined in tbis paper. Because tbe Weitzman results only bold for a directly additive separable cost function, tbe answer to tbis question is tbat all cost functions tbat are relevant for tbe analysis in tbe paper bave been examined.
Even tbough tbe analysis in tbis paper sbows tbat taxes are preferred over ITQs for some fisberies witbout stock effects on tbe cost side, otber arguments can be put forward in favor of ITQs. For example, it can be argued tbat ITQs bave tbe property tbat tbe fishermen collect tbe resource rent, wbile society collects tbe resource rent witb taxes. In otber words distributional arguments can lead to a recommendation for ITQs. Furtbermore, taxes are bard to compute and in many societies taxes are bard to cbange eacb year in response to cbanges in resource stock conditions. However, even if tbese arguments are accepted as correct, tbe analysis in tbis paper sbows tbat for some fisberies tbe total benefit wiU be bigber witb taxes wben tbere is economic uncertainty.
" See Williamson et al. (1972) for the formula of a second order Taylor approximation in two variables.
' * A second-order approximation must be logical, because such an approximation is conducted on the cost and benefit functions.
" The fisherman's first order condition for h(p, 9) and the optimality conditions for x, q, and X. " This conclusion may also be seen from the analysis in Anderson (1986) . As mentioned above, Anderson (1986) assumes that the fishermen take decisions before the random variable is realized. Furthermore, the growth function is linear. Even with these simplifying assumptions, the solution becomes very complicated.
